Behavior Coordination in E-commerce Supply Chains by Zhang, Yanhong et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
WHICEB 2015 Proceedings Wuhan International Conference on e-Business
Summer 6-19-2015
Behavior Coordination in E-commerce Supply
Chains
Yanhong Zhang
Institute of system Engineering of Hydraulic and Hydroelectricity School, Wuhan University, Wuhan,430072, China,
yh_zhang2004@126.com
Xianjia Wang
Institute of system Engineering of Hydraulic and Hydroelectricity School, Wuhan University, Wuhan,430072, China
Zhijie Chen
School of Management, Wuhan textile University, Wuhan,430073, China
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/whiceb2015
This material is brought to you by the Wuhan International Conference on e-Business at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for
inclusion in WHICEB 2015 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Yanhong; Wang, Xianjia; and Chen, Zhijie, "Behavior Coordination in E-commerce Supply Chains" (2015). WHICEB 2015
Proceedings. 65.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/whiceb2015/65
The Fourteen Wuhan Intemational Conference on E-Business——E-Business Management in Organization                       49 
 
Behavior Coordination in E-commerce Supply Chains 
Yanhong Zhang1,2* , Xianjia Wang1 , Zhijie Chen1,3 
1Institute of system Engineering of Hydraulic and Hydroelectricity School, Wuhan University, 
Wuhan,430072, China 
2College of Science, the Science and Technology of Wuhan University, Wuhan,430065, China 
3School of Management, Wuhan textile University, Wuhan,430073, China 
 
Abstract: This paper studies the behavior coordination of members in e-commerce supply chains with cooperative game 
theory. Under the environment of e-commerce, the retailers and the supplier can maximize their profits through the 
cooperation with the information provider. We study this cooperation by means of cooperative game theory and emphasize 
the importance of the information provider in the cooperation. We give a core allocation and a solution for these games. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of electronic information technology, information network have a great impact on 
the traditional supply chain. The large potential impact of the Internet on supply chain management makes the 
study of supply chain models in e-commerce timely and important. Robert and Horance[1] argues that by 
upsetting the balance among the contextual forces, it will be the emergence of a new vision of supply chain in 
e-commerce. Wu and Li[2] construct a randomized pricing strategy for online retailers by borrowing long 
standing promotion methods from traditional retailing. Jayashankar et al.[3] present an overview of relevant 
analytical research models that have been developed in these areas, and conclude with a discussion on future 
modeling opportunities in this area. Studies on Supply Chain Operation Mode for Agricultural Products under 
Electronic Commerce have been carried out and discussed[4],[5]. E-commerce service platform has been designed 
and implemented for the supply chain management of agricultural products[5]. 
As we all known that the supply chain management emphasizes the behavior coordination between the 
enterprises in the supply chain by information sharing and resources optimization allocation[6] to reduce the 
transaction costs. There's a lot of talk in the e-commerce supply chain about integrating systems, collaborating 
with partners[7]-[10]. When used appropriately, the new e-commerce technologies allow firms to streamline their 
business processes to achieve lower operating costs and in crease sales revenue, as well as to improve flexibility 
in the e-commerce[11] . Sanjay G. et al.[11] explore the coordination for the flexibility in e-commerce supply 
chain. 
In contrast, cooperative game theory emphasizes the cooperation between the companies. One of the main 
questions is whether the cooperation is stable, that is, whether there are allocations of the total profit among the 
companies such that no groups of companies would like to cooperate on its own[13],[14],[16]. Liang, Dong and 
Wilhelm study the e-commerce by the negotiation[10],[15]. Luis, Ana and Judith[16] analyze a traditional supply 
chain model by means of cooperative game theory, they show that the corresponding games are balanced and 
propose a stable solution concept(the mgpc-solution) for the game. 
In this paper, we analyze the e-commerce supply chains by means of cooperative games. We consider one 
period e-commerce supply chains with a single product. In such a supply chain, the retailers know about the 
product through the information platform constructed by the information provider and place one-time orders for 
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the product at the supplier. The supplier receives the order in the information platform. After production, the 
supplier delivers the goods to the retailers. The information provider acts as an intermediary with revenues. 
Every retailer and supplier pays the same information cost to the information provider in a period. There are no 
competitions between retailers, and they sell the goods on their own market. The larger the quantity that is put 
on the market, the lower the price per unit is for retailers. Each retailer chooses its order quantity such that its 
profit is maximized. 
The retailer pays the supplier a wholesale price per unit product ordered and delivered. This price is a 
decreasing function of the quantity ordered. The regular information cost is charged by the information provider 
according to the number of port clicked, and has nothing to do with the number of clicks on a port. Therefore, 
there exist incentives for cooperation among retailers. There are also the incentives for cooperation between the 
retailers and the supplier, and the retailers or supplier with the information provider. If the retailers combine 
their orders into one large order and place at the supplier, they enjoy a lower wholesale price. The supplier also 
hopes to receive a large order to earn more profits. The supplier may want to cooperate with the information 
provider to reduce the information cost. Besides, retailers may want to cooperate with the supplier and the 
information provider to reduce the wholesale prices and the information costs. Obviously, the total profit under 
full cooperation is larger than the sum of the individual profits. Because of the incentives for cooperation, we 
use cooperative game theory to study the supply chain. For this chain we define a corresponding cooperative 
game in which the supplier, the retailers and the information provider are players. We adapt some properties of 
the solution provided by Luis, Ana and Judith[15] to characterize our solution. 
The paper makes two contributions to the e-commerce supply chain. First, we use the cooperative game 
theory in e-commerce supply chain; Second, we emphasize the importance of the information provider in the 
cooperation in e-commerce supply chain. 
The contents of the paper are organized as follows. Section2 we briefly introduce the necessary concepts of 
cooperative game theory. Section3 gives the model of a single period e-commerce supply chain and study the 
related cooperative game and give an allocation for the game. Section4 concludes. 
 
2. PRELIMINIARIES COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY  
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair ),( vN , where },,2,1{ nN …=  is a 
finite set of players and v , the characteristic function, is a real valued function on N2 }:{ NSS ⊆=  
satisfying 0)( =φv . In this paper, the cardinality of a finite set is denoted by the operator || ⋅ ,i.e., || S  is the 
number of players in S , for any NS ⊆ . Sometimes we use lowercase letters to denote cardinalities, and thus 
|| Ss = for any NS ⊆ . A benefit vector, or allocation, is denoted by nRx∈ . The core of the game ),( vN  
consists of those allocations )(Nv of in which each coalition receives at least its benefits: 
})()(|R{),(Core NSallforSvxandNvxxvN
Si
i
Ni
i
n ⊂≥=∈= ∑∑
∈∈
 
A core allocation ),(Core vNx∈ is both efficient, that is )(Nxx
Ni
i =∑
∈
, and it satisfies the coalitional 
stability property, that is∑
∈
≥
Si
i svx )( for all NS ⊂ . A game is called balanced if its core is nonempty. 
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A game ),( vN is called monotone if for every NTS ⊆, with TS ⊆ , it holds that )()( TvSv ≤ .We 
denote by G the set of all monotone games. 
Given ),( vN G∈ , a player Ni∈ is a dummy if )()\()( iviSvSv += for all iNS \⊆ , that is, if all 
her marginal contributions are equal to )(iv . A player is called a null player if she is a dummy and 0)( =iv . 
Two players Nji ∈, are symmetric if )()( jSviSv ∪=∪ for all },{\ jiNS ⊆ , that is, if their marginal 
contributions to each coalition coincide. 
A single-valued solutionϕ for TU game ),( vN is a mapϕ : NN R→Γ where NΓ is the class of 
TU-games with player set N . The payoff to player Ni∈ in game Nv Γ∈ according to this solution is denoted 
by )(viϕ and Nii vv ∈= ))(()( ϕϕ . 
 
3. THE MODEL OF THE E-COMMERCE SUPPLY CHAIN AND RELATED COOPERATIVE 
GAME    
In this section, we study single period models of e-commerce supply chain involving a single product. The 
retailers and the supplier must use the information platform from different ports and make transaction in the 
information platform, while the retailers can make alliance to use the information platform from a port and make 
transaction with the supplier. Every retailer and supplier pays a regular information cost to the information 
provider in a period. 
3.1 The retailer –supplier-information provider problem(RSI-problem) 
We first concentrate on a chain with a single retailer. The retailer places a one-time order that the size is q   
units through the information platform. The ordered goods are produced by the supplier at a cost c ( 0≥c )of 
per unit. The cost of this order is the wholesale price )(qw . The more the retailer orders, the lower the price per 
units he has to pay. So the wholesale price function )(qw is a decreasing and continuous function with 
cqw ≥)( , 0≥q . The expected price function RRp →+: is decreasing and continuous in q .  
The retailer determines his order quantity q such that his profit is maximized: 
             Max tqqwqp −− ))()((  
             s.t.   Qq∈  
where )}()(|{ qwqpRqQ ≥∈= + is the set of feasible order size, that is, those order sizes that result in a 
nonnegative profit margin for the retailer from the commodities. 
 Given the retailer’s order size q , the supplier’s profit equals  
            Max tqcqw −− ))((  
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The information provider’s profit equals t2 . 
3.2 The retailer –supplier-information provider games(RSI-games) 
Now we consider single period cooperative models of e-commerce supply chains with a supplier, an 
information provider and multiple retailers. Each of the retailers places its order at the information platform 
provided by the information provider. The retailers have the possibility to cooperate among each other and place 
a joint order, which results in a lower wholesale price per unit. The retailers and the supplier also have the 
incentives to cooperate with the information provider with the absence of the information costs. 
Let },,1{ nN …= be the set of retailers and denote the supplier by 0, the information provider by I. Then 
}0{0 ∪= NN is the set of all retailers and the supplier and }I{01 ∪= NN is the set of all players in the 
chain. Similarly, we define }0{0 ∪= SS and }I{01 ∪= SS , for all NS ⊆ . If ∑
∈
=
Si
is qq denotes the total 
order size by a coalition NS ⊆ of retailers, then the joint benefit of this coalition equals 
                Max tqqwqp i
Si
Sii −−∑
∈
))()((  
            }allfor)()(|{: SiqwqpRqQq Sii
SS ∈≥∈=∈ +  
The cooperation among the group of retailers S and the supplier is described just as the joint benefit: 
                  Max tqcqp i
Si
ii 2))(( −−∑
∈
 
The worth of the grand coalition formed by retailers, supplier and the information provider equals 
                  Max i
Si
ii qcqp∑
∈
− ))((  
Luis, Ana and Judith[15] prove that cooperation with the supplier is attractive for retailers. While the cooperation 
with the information provider is also attractive for retailers and supplier since the information cost will 
disappear as long as the information provider is in the cooperation and the profit is positive. When the 
information provider is in the cooperation or the information cost is asked zero, the RSI-games is the RS-games 
that discussed by Luis, Ana and Judith[15]. So the profit function arising from cooperation in e-commerce have the 
similarly properties discussed in traditional supply chain. 
Lemma3.1. Let 
      tqqwqpqwq iiiii
ret
i −−=Ρ ))()(())(,( , tqcqwqwq iiiii −−=Ρ ))(())(,(sup  
NSi ⊆∈ , and tqii =Ρ )(I . Then 
(1) Isup ))(;())(;();( i
S
S
S
ii
S
S
S
i
ret
i
S
i
ret
i qwqqwqcq Ρ+Ρ+Ρ=Ρ ; 
(2) );();( cqcq Si
ret
i
c
i
ret
i Ρ≥Ρ ; 
(3) ))(;();( SS
S
i
ret
i
c
i
ret
i qwqcq Ρ≥Ρ and ))(;();( SSSireticireti qwqcq Ρ≥Ρ . 
Proof. (1) –(3)follows immediately from the definitions of retiΡ , supiΡ , IiΡ . 
Next we define the cooperative game corresponding to the supply chain in e-commerce described in our 
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situation that is RSI-game.  
Definition3.2 The cooperative game in e-commerce(RSI-game) ),( 1 vN is defined by 
               tqqwqpSv Si
Si
S
i
S
ii −−= ∑
∈
))()(()( , 
               tqcqpSv i
Si
c
ii 2))(()( 0 −−= ∑
∈
, 
and           ∑
∈
−=
Si
i
c
ii qcqpSv ))(()( 1  
for all coalitions NS ⊆ , and 0)( =φv . 
The definition above shows that a coalition of retailers benefit from a lower wholesale price per unit and a 
lower information costs, while a coalition including the supplier and information provider increases its profit 
due to the absence of the wholesale prices and the information costs. It is more attractive to cooperative with the 
information provider for the retailers and the supplier since )()( 01 SvSv > , )()( 1 SvSv > , NS ⊆ . This 
provides the companies in the chain with sufficient incentives for cooperation and that the information provider 
also has reasons to share the gain from cooperation with the retailers just as the supplier. 
Lemma3.3 Let ),( 1 vN be a game in e-commerce. Then 
(i) 0})I{( ≥∪Tv for all coalitions; 
(ii) v is super-additive; 
(iii) )(})I{( TvTv ≥∪ for all NT ⊆ ; 
(iv) ∑
∈
=
Si
ivSv }),I,0({)( 1 and })I,,0({}){\()( 11 iviSvSv =− for all NS ⊆ and Si∈ . 
Proof. (i)If }0{=T , then 0})I,0({})I{( ==∪ vTv ; 
If ST ⊆ , then 0))()((})I{( ≥−=∪ ∑
∈Si
S
iS
S
ii qqwqpTv ; 
If 0ST ⊆ and 1ST ⊆ , then 0))((})I{( ≥−=∪ ∑
∈
c
i
Si
c
ii qcqpTv ; 
         (ii)Let NTS ⊆, be two disjoint coalitions of retailers, then 
    )()( TvSv + tqqwqp SiS
Si
S
ii −−= ∑
∈
))()(( tqqwqp TiT
Ti
T
ii −−+∑
∈
))()((  
     TSiTS
Si
TS
ii qqwqp
∪
∪
∈
∪ −≤ ∑ ))()(( tqqwqp TSiTS
Ti
TS
ii −−+ ∪∪
∈
∪∑ ))()((  
     tqqwqp TSiTS
TSi
TS
ii −−= ∪∪
∪∈
∪∑ ))()(( )( TSv ∪=  
Furthermore 
)()( 0 TvSv + tqcqp ci
Si
c
ii 2))((
0
−−= ∑
∈
tqqwqp TiT
Ti
T
ii −−+∑
∈
))()((  
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           ci
Si
c
ii qcqp ))((
0
−≤ ∑
∈
tqcqp Ti
Ti
c
ii −−+∑
∈
))((  
           tqcqp ci
TSi
c
ii −−= ∑
∪∈
))((
0
)( 0 TSv ∪=  
and 
)()( 1 TvSv + ci
Si
c
ii qcqp ))((
0
−= ∑
∈
tqqwqp TiT
Ti
T
ii −−+∑
∈
))()((  
            ci
Si
c
ii qcqp ))((
0
−≤ ∑
∈
T
i
Ti
c
ii qcqp ))(( −+∑
∈
 
            ci
TSi
c
ii qcqp ))((
0
−= ∑
∪∈
)( 1 TSv ∪=  
 (iii)This follows from (ii) and the definition of the game.  
(iv)These results follow from the definition of the game. 
Obviously the game is not monotonic and does not satisfy the null property and symmetry. The first and 
third property in this lemma shows the important role of the information provider in the cooperation.  
3.3 The core of the game  
Recalling the properties of the characteristics v , the core of the game ),( 1 vN can be described as follows: 
Theorem 3.4 Let be the RSI-game. The core of this game equals 
),Core( 1 vN  
}),(;}),I,,0({);(|R{ 1
1
1 NSSvxNiivxNvxx
Si
ii
Ni
i
n ⊆≥∈≤=∈= ∑∑
∈∈
 
Proof. Let ),(Core 1 vNx∈ , 1Ni∈ . Then )( 1
1
Nvx
Ni
i =∑
∈
and }){\( 1
}\{1
iNvx
iNj
j ≥∑
∈
. 
Thus   }){\()()( 11
}\{
1
1
iNvNvxNvx
iNj
ji −≤−= ∑
∈
}),I,0({ iv= .  
Conversely, we only need to prove the following inequalities: 
)( 00 Svxx
Si
i ≥+∑
∈
, NS ⊆ and )( 11
0
Svxx
Si
i ≥+ ∑
∈
, 1NS ⊆  
The second inequality is obvious. We now prove the first inequality. 
0
\
0
11
xxxxx
SNj
j
Ni
i
Si
i +−=+ ∑∑∑
∈∈∈
∑
∈
−≥
SNj
jvNv
\
1
1
})I,,0({)(  
      ∑
∈
=
Si
iv })I,,0({ )(2})I,,0({ 0Svtiv
Si
=−≥ ∑
∈
     QED. 
Define the allocation )(0 vx by 0)(0I =vx , 0)(00 =vx , )}I,,0({)(0i ivvx = , Ni∈ . It is easy to see 
that the allocation v),Core()( 1
0 Nvx ∈ . We have the result: 
Theorem 3.5 Let be the RSI-game. Then the game is balanced.  
Since the supplier and the information provider get nothing, the allocation )(0 vx is the worst possible 
core-allocation for the supplier and the information provider. 
3.4 The solution of the game 
In this section we adjust some properties of the solution for the RS-game to get a solution for the RSI-game. 
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The solution assigns a payoff for the supplier and the information provider and is an allocation. In addition to 
the properties (a)-(d) similar to that described by Luis, Ana and Judith[15], a single-value solution for RSI-game 
has the property(e). 
(a)Efficiency: )()( 1
1
Nvv
Ni
i =∑
∈
ϕ . 
    (b)Stability: )()( Svv
Si
i ≥∑
∈
ϕ for all coalition NS ⊆ . 
(c)Retailer reduction: i
ii
i s
SvSvivv )()(})I,,0({)( 1 −−=ϕ for some coalitions NS i ⊆ and Ni∈ . 
(d) Preservation of differences for retailers: 
 })I,,0({})I,,0({)()( jvivvv ji −=−ϕϕ for all Nji ∈, with ji ≠ . 
(e) Share the reduction: i
ii
Ni s
SvSvvv )()()()( 10I
−=+ ∑
∈
ϕϕ . 
Then we have the main result in the following theorem3.6: 
Theorem3.6 Let ),( 1 vN be an RSI-game. The unique solution )(vϕ on the class of RSI-game, satisfying(a)-(e) 
defined by 
            
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∈−
=−
=
=
,,})I,,0({
,0),(
I,,
)(
Niiv
in
in
vi
β
αβ
α
ϕ  
where
s
t
SNS φα ≠⊆= ,max , s
SvSv
SNS
)()(min 1
,
−= ≠⊆ φβ . 
Corollary3.7 Let ),( 1 vN be an RSI-game, )(vϕ is the solution of the game ),( 1 vN . 
Then ),(Core)( 1 vNv ∈ϕ . 
Corollary3.8 Let )(vϕ is the solution of the RSI-game. If 0=t , then )(vϕ is the solution of the RS-game. 
Example3.9 Let }I,0,1,2{1 =N , 2=t , 4=c , qqp −= 12)(1 , qqp −= 20)(2 and 
               
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>+
≤≤
= 2,84
21,10
)( q
q
q
qw  
),( 1 vN is the corresponding game. Then  
            4)(I =vϕ , 14)(0 =vϕ , 7)(1 =vϕ , 55)(2 =vϕ  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The central problem that we have introduced is the behavior coordination between the members in the 
e-commerce supply chain with several retailers, one supplier and an information provider. All players have 
incentives to cooperate with each to reduce costs and increase profits. We analyze theses chains by means of 
cooperative game theory. The information provider plays an important role of in the cooperation. We show that 
the RSI-game has a nonempty core. A solution that recognizes the importance of the information provider in 
cooperation is given. These results imply that the companies in an e-commerce supply chain are willing to 
cooperate because there exists stable distributions of the joint profit. 
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